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CRIMINAL LAW NEWSLETTER

A

Avoiding Error in Closing Argument
by H. PatrickFurman

T

rial lawyers dream of the perfect closing argument, in which

they blend fact, emotion and
persuasion to sway an undecided jury to vote their way. Closing argument is the point at which counsel
can be most dramatic and argumentative. However, it is important to recognize the limitations on closing argument,
for two reasons. First, closing argument
is the point in trial at which trial lawyers'
emotions are most likely to lead them
astray into unprofessional and even unethical behavior. Secondly, a closing argument that is interrupted by an objection and an adverse ruling may lose effectiveness.
The general principles governing closing argument are easily stated. The
scope of closing argument is within the
discretion of the trial court, and rulings
thereon will not be disturbed absent a
gross abuse of discretion.' Closing argument must be confined to the evidence
adduced at trial and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence. 2 Counsel may not express personal opinions concerning the evidence
or witnesses. 3 Counsel may not make
arguments that appeal to the prejudices
of the jury,4 nor inject collateral issues
into closing arguments.5 Prosecutors
may not comment on the post-advise6
ment silence of a defendant.
Recognizing and following these basic
rules are not as easy. This article discusses some of the more common errors
committed in closing argument. Most of
the cases involve the closing arguments

Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman,
University of Colorado School of
Law, Boulder-(303) 492-8126

of prosecutors because of the nature of
the appellate process, but the principles
are applicable to both prosecutors and
defense counsel. Finally, the article discusses appellate review of claims of error in closing argument.

Comments on Witness
Credibility
The credibility of one or more witnesses is often central to the resolution of a
case. Jurors are given an instruction to
guide them in their determination of
credibility issues. 7 Clearly, counsel may
argue whether a witness has passed the
credibility test" and may tell the jury
that the jurors make the determination
of whether a witness is credible. 9
However, the right to comment on the
credibility of witnesses is not unlimited.
Counsel may not argue credibility in
terms that reflect their personal opinions.10 This rule is particularly strict for
prosecutors: "Expressions of personal
opinion as to the veracity of witnesses
are particularly inappropriate when
made by prosecutors in criminal trials.""
Thus, a statement that a witness "lied"
during his or her testimony has been
held inappropriate, 12 as has a statement
that a witness was "honest."13 In both
instances, nevertheless, the court found
the errors harmless because the improper comments were a small part of the
summation and because the jury was
properly instructed that closing arguments are not evidence. In People v.Trujillo, 4 however, comments that the defendant's statement was "riddled with
lies" were held to rise to the level of plain
error and justify reversal of the defendant's conviction. The Colorado Court of
Appeals in Trujillo reiterated that the
impropriety in such arguments is that
they amount to an expression of person-

al opinion as to the truth or falsity of testimony.
A defendant who testifies is subject to
the same sort of credibility attack as any
other witness. If a defendant laughs during the testimony of other witnesses and
during the prosecutor's closing argument, it is not plain error for the prosecutor to argue that these actions go to
15
the credibility of the defendant.

Injection of Collateral Issues
Closing argument should be confined6
to issues relating to guilt or innocence.'
It is improper for counsel to inject collateral issues, such as sympathy for a defendant or fear about the general crime
problem, into closing argument. For example, it has been held improper for either counsel to ask jurors to "stand in
the shoes" of a witness, victim or defendant. 7
A reference to the general problem of
drugs in society and the role of police
and informants in combatting that problem has been held improper. 8 A suggestion that drugs were being offered to the
"men, women and children of Denver"
was held improper when there was no
evidence presented as to the persons for
whom the drugs were intended. 19 Simply injecting the broader issue of drugs
in schools also has been held improper.20
Attempting to inflame a jury by suggesting that the defendant has engaged
in other illegal activity violates the general ban on evidence of other uncharged offenses and improperly shifts the jury's at21
tention away from the issues in a case.
This newsletter is preparedby the CBA
CriminalLaw Section. This month's
column was written by column editor
H. PatrickFurman.
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In a kidnapping case where the victim
was an adult but there was evidence that
the defendant wanted photographs of
young nude children, a suggestion that
candy in the defendant's glove box might
have been used to solicit young children
was held to appeal improperly to the sympathy and prejudice of the jury.22 Asserting that there was a "good argument"
that the defendant had engaged in another crime, after the defendant had been
23
acquitted of that crime, is improper.
Attempting to inflame a jury by characterizing the defendant as an animal is
improper. In People v. Hernandez, the
Colorado Court of Appeals said: "The
courts have condemned as improper a
prosecutor using such terms as 'rat,'
'dog' or 'animal' to describe a defendant."24 While this comment was made

in connection with an opening statement,
the cases cited and the opinion itself suggest that the condemnation extends to
every phase of the trial. The Hernandez
court described the prosecutor's comment
that "sometimes it takes a rat to catch a
rat.. ." as inflammatory, derogatory, de-

humanizing, inconsistent with the pros25
ecutor's role and dignity and improper.
Similarly, a reference in closing argument
to the defendant as a "lion" who stalked
"weak prey" has been held improper, 26
although not plain error, in the context
of the facts of the case, the instructions
of law and the arguments of the defense
counsel.
Inviting, even implicitly, the jury to
draw inferences about the defendant from
evidence that had been barred is an improper argument calculated to inflame
27

the jury.

Comments on Silence
Of Defendant
In People v. Reynolds, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
Any comment on the post-arrest silence of a defendant once he invokes
his right to remain silent may well violate a defendant's due process rights. 28
Two principles underlie this rule. First,
the government should not be allowed
to punish citizens for exercising a constitutional right. 29 Second, every post-advisement silence is ambiguous because
the silence may simply be nothing more
than the citizen's exercise of the right
and not an indication of any consciousness of guilt. 3 Comment of this sort has
been held to amount to plain error and
to justify reversal even in the 3labsence of
a contemporaneous objection.
34 /THE COLORADOLAWYER/ JANUARY1995/ VOL. 24, No. 1

The analysis is different if the silence
occurs before the advisement. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that it is proper
to impeach a testifying defendant with
his or her pre-arrest silence. 32 That Court
also has reasoned that post-arrest, preadvisement silence is not based on any
governmental inducement or implicit offer and has held that the use of such silence to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial did not violate either the
33
Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment.

"Closing argument is the
point at which trial lawyers'
emotions are most likely to
lead them astray into
unprofessional and even
unethical behavior."
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sort of silence or to use such silence in

39
closing argument to infer guilt.
During closing argument in People v.
7bdd, ° the prosecutor, after going through
the facts, said, "I believe there is no contradiction. Defendant will agree to that.
There is no other evidence at this point."
In affirming the conviction, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether
(1) the comments specifically focused on
the defendant's failure to testify, (2) a limiting instruction was given, (3) the comments were aggravated or repetitive and
(4) the defendant was the only person
who could have refuted the evidence
that
41
was the subject of the comments.
A comment on the silence of the defendant is particularly improper if it also misleads the jury. In People v. Burress,42 the prosecutor asked questions
which implied that the defendant refused
to talk with the police and then commented on this implication. In fact, the defendant had never been questioned by the
police, so the Supreme Court reversed
43
the conviction.

The Colorado Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed this issue but has
acknowledged the inherent ambiguity of Use of Instructions/Law
a defendant's post-arrest silence. In PeoClearly, counsel may use the relevant
ple v. Quintana,3 the defendant remained law and jury instructions during closing
silent after arrest (it was unclear when, argument. Nevertheless, counsel must
or if, an advisement was given) and then state the law accurately and may not
presented at trial, through witnesses oth- make personal comments on the law
er than himself, a defense of duress. The and instructions or personal comments
court noted that the defendant's silence about the other party's use of the law. It
could be interpreted in a number of dif- is improper to call into question the inferent ways and that it was, therefore, structions given by the trial court." Furso ambiguous and lacking in probative ther, much to the dismay of law faculties
value as to be inadmissible as substan- everywhere, it has been held proper for
tive evidence to disprove duress
against a a trial court to refuse to allow counsel to
35
nontestifying defendant.

A situation that frequently arises is
how to handle the "silence" of a defendant who is silent as to some details but
not others. Clearly, if there are inconsistencies between the post-arrest statements and the trial testimony, the defendant may be impeached with the inconsistencies, 36 and the inconsistencies
can then be used in the closing argument. The omission of a significant detail may amount to such an inconsistency,3 7 but if the trial testimony merely
augments, rather than contradicts, the
original statement, it is improper to allow impeachment using the original
statement or closing argument commenting on the original statement.'
Another recurring situation is that of
a defendant who falls silent only after
initially making a statement. It is improper to question a defendant about this

read from a law review article, on the
theory that doing so usurps the func45
tions of the jury instructions.
It has been held improper for a prosecutor to suggest to a jury that guilty
people prefer jury trials, while innocent
people prefer trials to the court. 46 It is
not improper for a prosecutor to note that
everyone who is convicted of a crime enjoyed the presumption of innocence at
the outset of trial: this is merely a proper comment that the evidence adduced
at trial may overcome the presumption
of innocence. 47 It is improper to shift or
misstate the burden of proof, but it is not
improper to respond to a defense argument that the prosecution failed to investigate other suspects by noting that the
defense saw the same information as the
prosecution and did not produce information suggesting another person committed the offense." s
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It is not improper for counsel to compare the evidence to the instructions and
argue that a lesser included instruction
is not applicable by merely pointing out
inconsistencies, 49 but it is improper to
tell the jury that opposing counsel requested a particular instruction. 50
The Court of Appeals declared harmless error the decision of a trial court to
refuse to allow the defense to comment
on the fact that a prosecution witness exercised the right against self-incrimination and refused to testify and that the
prosecution refused to immunize the witness. The court noted that the situation
might be different if the witness did not
testify due to the actions of the prosecution.51 Similarly, it has been held impropinvocaer to comment on a defendant's
52
tion of the spousal privilege.
It is improper for counsel to make disparaging remarks about the theory or
tactics of opposing counsel. Describing
counsel's theory as "insulting" or "a lie,"
calling the cross-examination "cheap innuendo" and questioning counsel's good
faith have resulted in a reversal of the
defendant's conviction.5 3 These sorts of
arguments constitute improper comments on the right to use the law and present a defense. They are inflammatory,
divert the jury from the issues at hand
and amount to forbidden expressions of
personal opinion.

Misleading Arguments
While closing arguments may include
all reasonable and legitimate inferences,
even if the inferences are illogical or erroneous, 54 "closing arguments to the jury... may not be utilized to mislead the
jury." 55 It has been held improper for defense counsel to engage in "flights of
fancy" by arguing that the defendant
found the stolen property when there
was no evidence to support the argument, and proper for the trial court to
preclude the further use by counsel of
such hypotheticals that lacked factual
foundation.56
In a theft by receiving case involving
guns, when the guns were in the possession of the authorities at the time of trial,
the prosecutor nonetheless asked, rhetorically, "So where is the proof of these
three other guns?"5 7 The court characterized this comment as "unfair [and]
misleading" 58 and held that it undermined the fundamental fairness of the
trial.
Counsel crosses the line from argument into improper conduct by arguing
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a theory that has no evidentiary support.
A wholly speculative argument that a
murder was motivated by the povertystricken defendant's desire to rob the victim has been held to be unprofessional
conduct.59 A speculative argument that
the defendant might have had to load
his gun when he retrieved it from his
home, made to bolster a claim of premeditation, was similarly condemned, although the error was found harmless
because the defendant was acquitted on
the premeditation charge. 60

Opening the Door
It is clear that improper argument by
one attorney may open the door to what
would otherwise be an inappropriate argument by opposing counsel. The principle was stated inKurtz v. People as "[Dlefense counsel may by improper argumentative comment open the door to a re61
sponse by the prosecuting attorney"
and in People v. Vialpando as "A prosecutor is afforded considerable latitude in
to a remark by opposthe right to reply
62
ing counsel."

In People v. Becker, defense counsel
argued that he could personally vouch
for the integrity of the defendant and
that the mens rea element in the offense
was necessary to prevent "our police and
prosecutors from becoming a Gestapo."63
The prosecutor, in rebuttal, "threatened
to abandon the prosecution of teenagers
who committed burglaries if the jury acquitted the defendant." 64 In light of the
defense counsel's comments, the lack of
a contemporaneous objection and the instructions to the jury, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The dissent argued that prosecutorial
misconduct should not be excused simply because defense counsel misbehaved
as well.
Where a murder defendant hugged
and kissed his mother after she testified,
the Court of Appeals held that it was
not improper for the prosecutor to note
in closing that the victim would never
again get to kiss his mother, because the
defendant's actions had opened the door
to the comment.6

5
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That court has also

held that it was proper for a prosecutor
to argue that "there was only one eyewitness to the crime" and that the prosecution has no control over the number
of witnesses to a crime after the defense
attacked the credibility of the victim/
witness.6 6 In a third case, the Court of
Appeals held that a closing argument accusing the other side of using "smoke
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screens" and "dirty evidence" opened the
door to a rebuttal that was otherwise im67
proper.

Scope of Appellate Review
There are two important factors affecting appellate review of alleged error in
closing argument. The first is whether
there was a contemporaneous objection
to the allegedly improper argument. The
second is whether the error was harmless when considered in the context of the
entire closing argument and trial.
Many lawyers are more reluctant to
object during closing argument than at
other points in a trial. They reason that
closing argument is, after all, argument
and that both sides should have great
latitude to interpret and argue the evidence. However, counsel must be aware
that a failure to make a contemporaneous objection during closing argument
can adversely impact the chances of winning on appeal.
In the absence of a contemporaneous
objection, Colorado's appellate courts will
reverse a conviction on grounds of error
in closing argument only if there is a
"gross abuse of discretion,"68 or an error
that is so significant as to undermine
the fundamental fairness of the trial6 9 or
"as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction."70 In
fact, a reviewing court may refuse even
to consider an argument of misconduct
in closing argument when there was no
contemporaneous objection. 7'
The other side of this coin is that when
counsel contemporaneously objects to a
comment, and the objection is sustained,
appellate courts will normally hold that
a curative instruction overcomes the error unless the error"is so prejudicial that,
but for the comment, the jury might not
have found the defendant guilty."72 The
appellate courts operate on the assump73
tion that jurors follow their instructions.
Although the courts do not use the
phrase "totality of the circumstances" in
the decisions discussing error in closing
argument, it is clear that the courts view
the alleged error in the context of the entire closing argument. Errors in closing
argument have been held harmless because the error was viewed as a relatively small and unimportant aspect of the
entire argument. For example, in People
v. Huggins,74 the Court of Appeals de-

scribed the improper arguments as a
"small and insignificant part" of the entire closing argument and affirmed the
conviction despite the impropriety.
36 /THE COLORADOLAWYER/ JANUARY1995 / VOL. 24, No. 1

Improper argument concerning a count
on which the defendant is acquitted will
normally be held harmless. Thus, improper argument concerning a count of
murder after deliberation was held harmless when the defendant was acquitted
of that charge and convicted of felony
75
murder instead.
Most appellate decisions review situations in which the trial court has allowed certain arguments. In People v.
Raibon,76 the Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court erred in barring defense counsel from commenting
on a missing prosecution witness. The
court held that any error was harmless
because the only possible prejudice to
the defendant was that it undercut his
efforts to claim that all of the witnesses
were engaged in a conspiracy to finger
him. He was allowed to argue this theory, and the absence of the other witness
was obvious. Thus, the trial court's refusal to allow specific comment did not
contribute to the conviction or affect the
fairness of the trial.

Conclusion
Trial lawyers love to argue. They particularly love closing argument because
they can be at their persuasive and argumentative best. However, the very
emotion that contributes to an effective
closing may also lead counsel into unprofessional and unethical behavior. In
the heat of trial, it is sometimes easy to
lose sight of professional responsibilities, but every unprofessional argument
adversely affects the reliability of jury
verdicts and the criminal justice system.
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Training Courses for Legal Secretaries and Support Staff Begin in January
*The

Denver Legal Secretaries Association ("DLSA") is again offering the Basic Legal Secretary Training Course and
the Professional Legal Secretary/Accredited Legal Secretary Training Course. Details about each course are given
below.

Basic Legal Secretary Raining Course
This course is designed for legal secretaries and support staff who have minimal law office experience or whose experience
has been limited to a specialized area of the law. It will be held on Thursday evenings from January 19 through March 16.
The course will be taught by local attorneys, educators and Certified Professional Legal Secretaries and is a structured program with twenty-four hours of concentrated study covering all major areas of the law. The course provides legal, procedural
and office management background necessary to perform efficiently and effectively, with an emphasis on practical information
that can be put to immediate use in the law office.
The DLSA Basic Legal Secretary Training Course represents a unique opportunity to enhance the competency and efficiency
of law office support personnel. For the student, the course can mean career advancement and greater job satisfaction; for the
employer, it is a cost-effective investment in a better-trained, more productive staff.
For more information about the Basic Legal Secretary Training Course, call Linda Chandler, Certified PLS, at (303) 634-4453.
Professional Legal Secretary ("PLS")/Accredited Legal Secretary ("ALS") Training Course
This course is taught by local attorneys, educators and members of DLSA who have attained PLS certification. A PLS is an
individual with at least three years' experience as a legal secretary who demonstrates ability to interact on a professional level
with attorneys, clients, judges and co-workers; assumes responsibility; exercises initiative and judgment; has a working knowledge of procedural law and research; and works with a minimum of supervision. The PLS Training Course prepares the advanced legal secretary to sit for a two-day examination administered by the National Association of Legal Secretaries International® ("NALS"), which covers written communication skills and knowledge; ethics; legal secretarial procedures; legal secretarial accounting; legal termination, techniques and procedures; exercise ofjudgment; and legal secretarial skills.
An ALS is an individual with at least one year of experience as a legal secretary or equivalent legal secretarial training who
wishes to demonstrate a commitment to and aptitude for succeeding in the ever-changing legal environment. The course, designed to prepare individuals to take the PLS examination, also provides valuable information for individuals wishing to take
the ALS examination. The six-hour written ALS exam demonstrates ability to perform business communication tasks; gauges
ability to maintain office records and calendars and prioritize multiple tasks when given "real life" scenarios; measures understanding of office equipment and related procedures; denotes aptitude for understanding legal terminology, legal complexities
and supporting documents; assesses recognition of accounting terms to resolve accounting problems; and appraises knowledge
of law office protocol as prescribed by ethical codes. The one-day ALS examination is divided into three parts: written communication, comprehension and application; office administration, legal terminology and accounting; and ethics, human relations
and applied office procedures.
The DLSA Professional Legal Secretary/Accredited Legal Secretary Training Course will be held on successive Thursdays,
from February 2 through March 16. For more information, call De Anne Larrow, Certified PLS at (303) 980-1077.
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